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Abstract
Exposure to urban traffic-induced air pollution is a major health concern
of cities. This paper analyzes the urban structure when localized pollution
exposure arises from commuting traffic and investigates the feedback effect
of endogenous pollution on residential choices. The presence of stronger
traffic-induced air pollution exposure reduces the geographical extent and
the population of cities. Land rents fall with distance from the city center
while population densities may be non-monotonic. Cleaner vehicle technolo-
gies reduce pollution exposure everywhere, increase population and density
everywhere and do not affect the spatial extent of the city. The paper com-
pares the urban equilibrium with the first-best. The first-best structure is a
less expanded city with higher densities at the center and lower densities at
the fringe.
Keywords: residential choice, traffic-induced air pollution, localized
pollution exposure, urban structure
1. Introduction
Despite technological improvements and reduction in air pollution emis-
sions over the last years (WHO, 2014), air pollution remains a major concern.
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More than 400,000 Europeans still die prematurely each year because of air
pollution (EEA, 2014). It is a particular concern for urban areas where
population is highly concentrated and traffic is the major source of primary
pollutants (EEA, 2014). In China, 87% of major cities were recently declared
to exceed the guidelines set by the World Health Organization in terms of air
pollution concentrations (Zhang and Cao, 2015). Pollution from urban traffic
is acknowledged to cause harmful effects not only on the environment but
also on human health. Besides their concerns for accessibility and housing
space, residents are preoccupied by the health impact of air pollution in their
close neighborhood (Chay and Greenstone, 2005; WHO, 2014) and display
higher willingness to pay to live in less polluted neighborhoods (e.g. Smith
and Huang, 1995; Bickerstaff and Walker, 2001; Lera-Lo´pez et al., 2012).
As residents have incentives to relocate to less polluted urban areas, they
may make longer commuting trips to their workplaces, thereby generating ad-
ditional pollution and exposing other residents further. As a result, the spa-
tial distribution of both residents and urban pollution is strongly intertwined.
This endogeneity between the choice of residence and pollution patterns calls
for a dedicated study of the spread of pollution and residences. While urban
compaction policies might address environmental concerns linked to total ur-
ban emissions, more dispersed urban development might well be beneficial in
terms of reducing the impact of localized pollutants, improving local house-
holds’ well-being and health (e.g. Borrego et al., 2006; Manins et al., 1998;
Martins, 2012; De Ridder et al., 2008; Marshall et al., 2005; Schindler and
Caruso, 2014). In order to design appropriate urban environmental policies,
one requires a detailed understanding of how households’ choices and urban
structures interact and impact emission generation and health. This is the
purpose of this paper.
We extend the standard monocentric city model (Alonso, 1964) with an
endogenous local pollution externality that arises from the traffic passing at
each location. Our central issue is the endogenous link between pollution
exposure and residential choices. We investigate the effects of localized traf-
fic pollution. Allowing for an analytical solution, the model offers a detailed
investigation of the feedback effect of endogenous local pollution externalities
on residential choices. We show that the stronger the aversion and exposure
to traffic-induced pollution are, the smaller are the geographical extent and
the population of the city. Households tend to reside further away from the
CBD to reduce their exposure to pollution, which creates a tension on the
land market near the city border. Land rents fall with distance from the
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CBD while population densities may be non-monotonic. We also show that
cleaner vehicle technologies reduce pollution exposure everywhere, increase
the city population and its density everywhere and do not affect the spatial
extent of the city. They induce higher and steeper land rents everywhere and
non-monotonic population density profiles are possible for a smaller set of pa-
rameters. Compared to previous urban economics literature with aggregate
city-wide pollution (e.g. Verhoef and Nijkamp, 2003), we show that lower
local traffic-induced air pollution differs from a lower city-wide pollution in
terms of its effects on the city extent, the population density and the land
rent gradient. Finally, the socially optimal city structure is a less expanded
city with smaller population and may also hold non-monotonic population
densities. The first-best has higher densities at the center and lower den-
sities at the fringe. The first-best can be decentralized through a localized
lump-sum tax.
In contrast to this paper, the urban economic literature mostly focuses
on urban air pollution generated by exogenous sources (e.g. Henderson, 1977;
Arnott et al., 2008; Rauscher, 2009; Kyriakopoulou and Xepapadeas, 2013)
or by endogenous industrial sources (Regnier and Legras, 2014). A few
urban economic contributions consider traffic-induced pollution (e.g. Fisch,
1975; Robson, 1976; Proost and Dender, 1998; Van Marrewijk, 2005; Mar-
shall et al., 2005; Lange and Quaas, 2007; Boadway et al., 2011; Gaigne´
et al., 2012). Fisch (1975) introduces traffic-induced pollution as a cost (for
analytical tractability) in a close city and discusses numerical simulations
about pollution taxes. Robson (1976) introduces traffic-induced pollution as
a disutility also in a closed city model. In contrast to our paper, however, he
does not introduce the standard trade-off between residential and commuting
choices (again for analytical tractability). McConnell and Straszheim (1982)
discuss automobile pollution and congestion and provide numerical assess-
ments of pricing and emission policies. Close to this paper, Verhoef and
Nijkamp (2003) discuss numerical simulations of an urban model where resi-
dents are homogeneously harmed by the ‘total pollution’ generated by com-
muters. However, pollution externalities are spatially differentiated: while
some pollutants like ozone are undoubtedly of a regional nature, primary
emissions like CO, PM2.5 and PM10 vary locally (e.g. Colvile et al., 2001;
Jerrett et al., 2005; Kingham et al., 2000). To our knowledge, the impact
of local pollution exposure from urban commuting has not been studied in
an open city framework. This paper, thus, departs from previous literature
and provides a general framework to study technological and societal impacts
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on urban and pollution patterns. It offers a rejoinder to results by Robson
(1976) and Verhoef and Nijkamp (2003) but takes on a per-distance pollution
perspective. Urban properties are derived, comparative statics are performed
and the optimal urban policy is analyzed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
the model and the competitive land market equilibrium with housing choice
and traffic-induced air pollution. Conditions for the existence of equilibrium
and equilibrium properties are analyzed. Section 3 presents comparative
statics on the exogenous model parameters. In Section 4, the first-best policy
allocation and optimal city structure are presented and compared to the
equilibrium ones. Section 5 discusses and concludes. Appendices A and B
contain the proofs.
2. Urban equilibrium
In the tradition of Alonso (1964), we use a linear monocentric urban model
with a spaceless CBD at distance r = 0, identical households and absentee
landlords. The city is open and households migrate into the city as long as
they gain a higher utility than the utility obtained in the rest of the world,
u¯. Each household is endowed with a Cobb-Douglas utility function1 that
includes the exposure to the local pollution P (r) induced by the commuting
traffic passing through the location at distance r to the CBD, in addition to
a general basket of goods Z(r) and housing space H(r)
U = κH(r)αZ(r)1−αP (r)−β (2.1)
where α and (1 − α) represent the preference for each good respectively
(0 < α < 1), and β the aversion to pollution exposure (0 < β < 1). For
convenience, we use κ ≡ (1− α)α−1α−α as a simplification constant.
Besides the housing and composite consumptions, households spend their
income Y on a commuting cost t r, which is linear with distance from the CBD
and there is no congestion. They maximize utility subject to the following
budget constraint
H(r)R(r) + Z(r) + t r ≤ Y (2.2)
where R(r) is the rent per acre at location r.
1The Cobb-Douglas is also chosen by Fisch (1975) and Robson (1976).
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Each household residing at location r undergoes a negative externality
from being exposed to air pollutants generated by commuters who live at
further distances from the CBD, up to the urban boundary rf , and pass by r
on their trip to work. We assume that there is one commuter per household
as in previous models (e.g. Anas and Xu, 1999). Exposure to local pollution2
P (r) is increasing with the traffic volume passing by r
P (r) = 1 + a+ b
rf∫
r
n(r) dr (2.3)
The parameters a > 0 and b > 0 measure the impacts of the regional
and traffic-induced pollution in the city. Regional pollution originates from
sources other than commuting traffic and is assumed to be the same over the
city (Fowler et al., 2013). Traffic-induced pollution depends on the traffic
volume
rf∫
r
n(r) dr and the vehicle technology b which is expressed in terms
of pollution emission per vehicle and unit of traveled distance.3 Since most
industrial or agricultural pollutants are largely independent from population
growth (Cramer, 2002), a is exogenous in our model, i.e. not related to the
total city population. In the absence of pollution (a = b = 0), the pollution
profile P (r) is equal to one and does not affect the utility level.
In equilibrium, all households get the same reservation utility level u¯, no
matter their residential location since they are identical and migration is free.
The equilibrium is defined by the functions Z(r), H(r), P (r) and R(r) and
the scalar rf that satisfy the pollution exposure property (2.3) and the land
allocation property R(r) = max{Ψ(r), RA}, where Ψ(r) is the unit land bid
rent given by
Ψ(r) = max
Z(r),H(r)
Y − tr − Z(r)
H(r)
s.t. U(Z(r), H(r), P (r)) ≥ u (2.4)
2The functional form for the externality follows from Robson (1976). It does not include
a spatial diffusion component (e.g. Kyriakopoulou and Xepapadeas (2013)) in order to
analyze only direct local effects of location choice and because our aim is an analytical
model solution and analysis.
3Distance effects on engine temperature and emissions have been considered in simu-
lations by Schindler and Caruso (2014) but would add terms within the integral of the
pollution equation here, which is an unnecessary complication at this stage.
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The unit land bid rent expresses the maximum land rent that the household
is willing to pay given its outside utility u¯ and income Y . Households take
the pollution profile as given.
In the following, we drop the reference to r for Z,H, P and R for con-
ciseness whenever possible.
Consumption. The household’s demand function for housing H and
composite good Z are derived from the maximization problem (2.4). As noted
in Fujita and Thisse (2002), households have no incentives to get a surplus
over their utility u so that the constraint (2.4) binds. Defining Ĥ(Z, u) as the
unique solution of U(Z,H, P ) = u, we can find the consumption of the com-
posite good Z that maximizes the bid rent Ψ̂(r, Z) ≡ (Y − tr − Z) /Ĥ(Z, u).
Equating dΨ̂(r, Z)/dZ to zero we find the equilibrium demand functions for
the composite good Z and then housing H as
Z = (1− α) (Y − tr) (2.5)
H = α u¯1/α P β/α(Y − rt)−(1−α)/α (2.6)
One can show that (d/dZ) Ψ̂(r, Z) changes once from positive to negative
so that this solution yields a maximum. Housing consumption rises with
pollution exposure. To keep households in more polluted locations, land-
lords must compensate them with lower land rent and larger residences. For
positive consumption, we assume Y − t rf > 0 in the sequel.
Spatial distribution of pollution exposure. The spatial distribu-
tion of pollution exposure is derived from the population density distribution
n(r), which itself is derived from the equilibrium housing consumption after
normalizing available land everywhere to unity: n(r) = 1/H(r). Since P is
differentiable we can replace definition (2.3) by
·
P = −b/H and P (rf ) = 1 + a
where the dot superscript refers to the derivative with respect to r,
·
P =
dP/dr. The above identity reflects the two-way dependence of housing con-
sumption and pollution exposure distribution within the city. Since H > 0,
local pollution exposure is a decreasing function of distance from the CBD.
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Using the above expression of H, we get the following differential equation:
·
PP β/α = −bα−1u−1/α (Y − tr)(1−α)/α (2.7)
where
·
PP β/α is equivalent to (α/(α + β))(d/dr) P (α+β)/α. Then, assuming
r ∈ [0, rf ] and rf < Y/t, this expression integrates to
P = P0
[
a0 +
t
α
∫ rf
r
(Y − ts)(1−α)/αds
]α/(α+β)
(2.8)
where
P0 =
(
b (α + β)α−1t−1u−1/α
)α/(α+β)
> 0 and a0 = ((1 + a) /P0)
(α+β)/α > 0
The term P0 reflects the base traffic pollution level for given preferences
and technology, while a0 relates this base pollution level, which is generated
within the city, to the exogenous regional pollution, a. One can see that
exposure to pollution is higher close to the CBD.
Urban fringe and land profiles. Farmers pay a constant and ex-
ogenous agricultural rent RA, which is the opportunity cost of rent. The
boundary of the city rf is the location where the bids of farmers and house-
holds equalize, i.e. where Ψ(r) = RA. Thus, the urban equilibrium must
satisfy R(rf ) = RA and R(r) > RA for all r < rf . Under Cobb-Douglas
preferences, expenses on housing consumption are equal to the share α of
income net of commuting: R(r)H(r) = α (Y − tr). Expression (2.6) gives
the following land rent profile
R = u−1/α (Y − t r)1/α P−β/α (2.9)
The land rent increases with the housing share in expenditure α and available
income Y − tr but decreases with higher utility in the rest of the world u¯,
commuting costs t and the level of local pollution exposure P (r).
We can now make explicit the dependence of the land rent and the fringe
rf and discuss the existence of the urban equilibrium.
First, the city border rf is given by the city border condition, R(rf ) = RA,
and yields a unique value
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rf =
(
Y − (1 + a)β u¯ RαA
)
/t (2.10)
which is smaller than Y/t as in the standard urban model and validates
the above assumption rf < Y/t. The city border does not depend on the
pollution technology parameter b. This is because there is no traffic and no
traffic-induced exposure at the fringe but only regional pollution. The fringe
distance, however, diminishes with regional pollution a, which is a rejoinder
to results by Robson (1976) for stationary pollution sources and Verhoef and
Nijkamp (2003) for city-wide pollution. As in the literature, the city border
increases with larger income Y and decreases with larger commuting cost t,
external utility u and agricultural rent RA. Note that the city is not empty
if rf > 0; that is, RA < R
∗
A where
R∗A ≡
(
Y
(1 + a)βu
)1/α
(2.11)
Note that this could be due to a strong aversion β to pollution exposure
originating from regional pollution a.
Second, the gradient of the land rent is given by differentiating (2.9) so
that ·
R
R
= − 1
α
t
Y − tr −
β
α
·
P
P
(2.12)
The first negative term describes the land rent in absence of traffic-induced
pollution exposure (
·
P = 0) or when there is no aversion to exposure (β = 0).
The second term is positive since
·
P < 0. It reflects the effect of traffic-induced
pollution exposure, which falls with distance from the CBD. In Appendix A,
we show that the land rent is a decreasing function of r on [0, rf ] if and only
if RA ≤ R∗∗A where
R∗∗A ≡
α
β
1 + a
b
t (2.13)
For land rent to fall everywhere with distance from the CBD, the effects of
traffic pollution (b) should therefore not be too high compared to regional
pollution and commuting costs (a and t). If this condition does not hold, bid
rents first decrease as one moves away from the CBD but then increase in
the neighborhood of r = rf .
The two conditions RA ≤ R∗A and RA ≤ R∗∗A are sufficient and necessary
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for a unique urban equilibrium. When the two conditions hold, residential
bid rents lie above RA for r ∈ [0, rf ], which is consistent with the urban
equilibrium. Otherwise, either the city is nil or the households’ land bid
rents lie below RA near the fringe. In case traffic pollution raises such that
R∗∗A falls below RA, it harms all households who then bid for a lower land rent
near the fringe. However, since the bid of households at the fringe is close
to the agricultural rent, a stronger traffic-induced pollution exposure leads
those households to lower their bid below the agricultural offer. Formally,
the households’ bid rent increases close to rf so that R(rf−dr) < RA and
R(rf ) = RA, which is incompatible with an urban equilibrium.
The condition highlights the importance of regional pollution from sources
other than traffic for the existence of an equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique urban equilibrium if and only if RA ≤
min{R∗A,R∗∗A }. Equilibrium land rents fall with distance from the center.
The equilibrium can be understood from the left hand side panel of Figure
2,4 which displays the graphs of the land rent R(r) for different values of RA
and, therefore, for different values of rf since R(rf ) = RA. The dashed
curve depicts the land rent value in the absence of traffic-induced pollution
(b = 0). The solid curves display the equilibrium land rents, which fall in
every location. The value of the fringe distance rf and the outside land rent
RA lie at the intersection between the solid and dashed curves. The upper
solid curve displays the equilibrium land rent for the critical value RA = R
∗∗
A .
No urban equilibria exist for RA above this value. The dotted curves depict
the households’ bid rents in those cases. As those bids increase at the city
fringe, farmers necessarily overbid households there.
In case the level of traffic pollution exposure is very high (higher β),
households’ aversion to traffic-induced pollution exposure results in a pop-
ulation shift towards the fringe such that the land rent does not fall at the
fringe and no equilibrium is reached (RA < R
∗∗
A does not hold). The traffic-
induced pollution imposes a condition (not continuous) on the existence of
urban equilibrium that is different from the condition imposed by global pol-
lution. While the latter reduces households’ net utility and binds when the
4The parameters of the figure are {α, β, a, b, Y , u} ={0.333333, 0.5,1.35 10−6,
0.05, 30000., 42.}, Ra ∈ {0, 90740741, 120987654, 151234568, 181481481, 211728395,
241975309}.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium land rent and population density
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Note: The left hand side panel shows rent profiles and the right hand side panel the density
profiles with respect to distance from the CBD for different values of agricultural rent RA.
The fringe distance lies at the intersection between the solid and dashed curves. Thick
solid lines display urban equilibria, whereas dotted lines depict profiles in absence of urban
equilibrium. The line close to R∗∗A represents the land rent schedule equal to R
∗∗
A , which is
the highest land rent for equilibrium. The curve of the density population related to R¯∗∗A
is the one for which land rent is always decreasing.
city reaches a zero size, the former alters households’ utility levels and bid
rents in such a way that the land market cannot clear around the city border.
Population density and size. Population density n(r) is directly de-
rived from housing consumption and hence from pollution exposure according
to (2.6): n = 1/H = −
·
P/b. The density is actually
n(r) = α−1u¯−1/αP−β/α(Y − tr)(1−α)/α (2.14)
Its properties depend on the convexity of the equilibrium pollution exposure
P . The latter is a convex function of r if RA ≤ R¯∗A where
R¯∗A ≡ (1− α)
α
β
1 + a
b
t (2.15)
with R¯∗A < R
∗∗
A (see Appendix A). Otherwise, it is first convex and then
becomes concave for locations close to rf (see Appendix A). Therefore, under
RA ≤ R¯∗A, the population density n decreases everywhere. Also, since this
condition is more restrictive than condition (2.13), it guarantees the existence
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of an urban equilibrium. By contrast, under RA > R¯
∗
A, the pollution exposure
profile P is convex for small r and concave for r close to the city fringe
rf . Then, if R¯
∗
A < RA ≤ min{R∗A,R∗∗A }, an urban equilibrium exists with
non-monotonic population density. High opportunity costs of land reduce
the spatial extent of the city such that the additional benefit from reduced
pollution exposure obtained near the fringe can only be compensated by lower
housing consumption. This effect is depicted in the right hand side panel of
Figure 2, which plots the urban density profiles for the same parameters as
in the left hand side panel. Density profiles depicted in the lower part of the
figure are decreasing while the ones in the upper part are increasing with
distance from the CBD. Equilibrium profiles are again displayed with solid
lines while out-of-equilibrium density profiles are shown with dots.
From (2.14), we see that the density at the fringe is:
n(rf ) = α
−1u¯−1(1 + a)−βR1−αA (2.16)
Traffic-induced pollution has no effect on the density at the fringe location
because there is no traffic pollution at the fringe. By contrast, a larger global
exogenous pollution reduces the equilibrium density at the fringe because
households demand larger land plots to compensate for the disutility from
pollution.
Proposition 2. The population density falls monotonically from the city
center to the city fringe if RA ≤ R¯∗A and is non-monotonic otherwise.
To sum up this section, traffic-induced pollution alters households’ bid
rents. Urban equilibria exist for a smaller set of parameters compared to a
model without such pollution. In the presence of traffic-induced pollution,
equilibrium population densities may be rising in the fringe neighborhood.
Equilibrium land rent gradients nevertheless remain negative as in the clas-
sical theory of the monocentric city.
3. Comparative statics
We now study the impact of the exogenous model parameters of interest,
namely vehicle technology, regional pollution, aversion to pollution exposure
and transport costs.
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Clean vehicle technology (b). Cleaner vehicle technologies reduce
the vehicle emission factor b. However, while cleaner technologies diminish
one’s exposure to existing vehicles, they make the city more attractive and
foster population migration and commuting traffic. As a result, the impact
of the clean technology is mitigated by a larger flow of commuters. Thus,
the impact of clean technology might be ambiguous.
Nevertheless this model shows that a lower emission factor b causes lower
equilibrium pollution exposure P throughout the city. This is because, on
the one hand, pollution exposure remains the same at the fringe location
where P (rf ) = 1 + a (independent of the city population), while the fringe
distance rf is independent of b due to (2.10). On the other hand, by (2.7),
pollution exposure falls less rapidly with distance from the CBD as b gets
smaller. This property has an impact on the other variables. Indeed, from
(2.14), we can see that the population density n(r) increases with smaller b
through its effect on pollution exposure. The total population in the city,
N =
rf∫
0
n(r) dr, then increases with cleaner vehicle technology. From (2.9),
land rents increase with smaller b while their gradients become steeper (see
Appendix A).
Finally, by (2.15), cleaner vehicle technology raises the threshold R
∗
A.
Consequently, a non-monotonic population density emerges only for a smaller
set of parameters.
Proposition 3. Cleaner vehicle technologies (smaller b) reduce pollution ex-
posure, increase the city population and its density throughout the city and
do not affect the spatial extent of the city. They induce higher and steeper
land rents everywhere. Non-monotonic population density profiles emerge for
a smaller set of parameters.
Regional pollution (a). Lower regional pollution a has a direct effect
on utility for all residents. However, this effect is mitigated by the indirect
effect of traffic-induced pollution. Lower regional pollution indeed makes
residence in the city more attractive and increases its geographical extent (see
(2.10)). As a consequence, more residents commute from locations farther
from the CBD so that regional pollution is partly substituted by traffic-
induced pollution. This balance is apparent in expression (2.8) where a lower
a decreases a0 and increases rf . However, it can be shown that the direct
effect dominates so that lower regional pollution a reduces pollution exposure
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P everywhere (see Appendix A). Observe that since traffic-induced pollution
is nil at the fringe and implies no exposure there, regional pollution is the
only pollution component that determines the spatial extent of the urban
area. By (2.14), population densities increase everywhere while the total
population N expands. By (2.9), land rents become higher. However, land
rent gradients become flatter with lower a (see Appendix A).
For the purpose of empirical analysis, it is important to identify the di-
rection of the effects of regional versus traffic-induced pollution. The first
two rows of Table 1 summarize the above results. One can observe that
those pollution sources differ by their effects on the fringe distance, fringe
population density and land rent gradient steepness. In addition, from the
previous section, they have a different effect on population density profiles.
Table 1: Comparative statics
Effect of X = rf P (r) R (r) n (r) N |
·
R (r)|
emission per vehicle dX/db 0 + - - - -
regional pollution dX/da - + - - - +
aversion to pollution
exposure
dX/dβ - - - - - nd
unit transport cost dX/dt - - + + - nd
Note: A marginal increase in an exogenous parameter (rows) causes an increase (+) or
decrease (-) in the endogenous model variable X (columns); (nd : not discussed).
Proposition 4. The effect of a lower traffic-induced air pollution is different
from a lower regional pollution as it does not impact the geographical extent
and population density at the fringe. It also induces a rise in the land rent
gradient and can lead to a non-monotonic population density.
Aversion to pollution exposure (β). A stronger aversion to pollu-
tion (higher β) reflects the citizens’ increasing preferences for air quality and
their stronger values for quality of life and health. It can readily be seen from
(2.10) that a higher β diminishes the city extent rf . It can be shown that
pollution exposure P decreases with larger β. This is because, from (2.7),
the pollution exposure gradient
·
P is smaller with larger β as P β/α rises with
larger r and because pollution exposure integrates
·
P from r to a smaller rf .
By (2.16), a stronger aversion to pollution exposure diminishes the popula-
tion density at the fringe. By (2.9) and (2.14), the impact on population
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density and land rent depends on P β/α. It can be shown that P β/α rises with
higher β in the case of both regional pollution or traffic-induced pollution
(see Appendix A). As a result, a stronger aversion to pollution exposure de-
creases the population density and land rent. By the same argument, the
total population also falls.
Note that the parameter β can also be interpreted as a households’ percep-
tion of the health risk associated with pollution rather than a simple aversion
to pollution exposure. The perception of such a risk is a key aspect identified
in the social science literature (Gatersleben and Uzzell, 2000; Istamto et al.,
2014). Hence an upward bias in the perception of health risk caused by air
pollution raises the parameter β and amplifies the above effects.
Unit transport costs (t). In this model, the unit transport cost t
captures several factors such as gasoline price, gasoline tax, per-km tax and
a household’s opportunity cost of travel time (lost leisure, child care cost...).
Since transport costs discourage households to commute long distances, they
help reduce pollution emissions. From (2.10) we see that higher transport
costs move the urban fringe closer to the CBD. Also, higher transport costs
reduce the pollution everywhere in the city. They indeed decrease the vehicle
traffic everywhere, which implies a smaller (absolute value of the) gradient for
the pollution exposure P (see (2.7)). Since the pollution exposure integrates
this gradient from r to a smaller fringe distance rf , the pollution exposure
P is necessarily smaller for all r. In turn, by (2.9) and (2.14), the lower
pollution exposure raises the population density and land rent everywhere,
except at the city fringe where the population density and land rent remain
the same. Finally, total population falls. Those results are reported in Table
1.
Vehicle fuel consumption efficiency (t, b). It is of interest to study
the impact of more energy efficient vehicles as it has occurred over the last
four decades. Lower fuel consumption per distance unit leads not only to
lower transport cost t but also to lower pollution emission per vehicle b. That
is, we have a simultaneous fall in t and b. Lower fuel costs entice households
to commute more and reside further away from the center whereas lower
exposure makes the city center more attractive. In Table 3, we can deduce
that the city population N and its geographical extent rf expand. Lower fuel
costs decrease land rents but lower emissions increase them everywhere. As
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a result, the net effect on land rent is ambiguous. The effect on population
density and exposure to pollution at each location is also ambiguous. In
other words, vehicles pollute less but the traffic becomes more intense.
4. Optimal city structure
In equilibrium, households do not consider the consequences of their com-
muting decisions on others’ exposure to pollution. We now characterize the
first-best optimum where a planner internalizes the pollution exposure ex-
ternality. Analyses of both optimum pricing schemes and their effects on
optimum city structures in the context of traffic-induced externalities are
dominantly found in congestion literature within discrete (Brueckner, 2014)
or continuous space (Tikoudis et al., 2015; Verhoef, 2005; Vickrey, 1969). In
the context of traffic-induced air pollution, only McConnell and Straszheim
(1982) and Robson (1976) compare equilibrium and optimum city structures.
The former use numerical simulation while the latter does not explicitly an-
alyze the nature of the optimal policy rule. We extend this literature by
solving and discussing a first-best optimum over a continuous space.
The planner’s maximization problem. In the present open city
framework, following e.g. Fujita (1989) (p.65) the objective of the planner is
to maximize the aggregate land rent (ALR) to the land owners and, thus,
the total economic outcome given the endogenous traffic-induced pollution
exposure and migration. The planner’s problem is
max
{H(.),Z(.),n(.),P (.),rf}
ALR =
∫ rf
0
[(Y − t r − Z(r))n(r)−RA]dr (4.1)
s.t.
P (r) = 1 + a+ b
∫ rf
r
n(r) dr (4.2)
u¯ ≤ U [(Z(r), H(r), P (r)] (4.3)
n(r) = 1/H(r) (4.4)
We can differentiate and replace the integral equality (4.2) by the conditions
P˙ (r) = −b n(r) and P (rf ) = 1 + a. The problem then becomes an optimal
control problem to which we can apply Pontryagin’s maximization principle
with a free final condition at r = 0. In the following, we drop the reference
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for the location r on the control and state functions (H, Z, n, P ) whenever
it brings no confusion.
The generalized Hamiltonian H for the above problem writes as
H(Z,H, P, µ, r) = (Y − t r − Z)/H −RA − b µ /H
after n is replaced by 1/H using (4.4). The control variables Z and H satisfy
the migration constraint (4.3) and µ is the co-state variable of the motion
equation P˙ = −b/H associated with the state variable P . The co-state
variable µ is a function of distance r from the CBD and measures the marginal
impact that an additional household induces on others when it locates at
r. The co-state variable µ(r) then reflects the shadow cost of traffic-induced
pollution exposure to the residents located in the interval [0, r). The necessary
conditions for the optimum are given by
(H∗, Z∗) ∈ arg max
H,Z
H(Z,H, P, µ, r) s.t. U(Z,H, P ) ≥ u (4.5)
µ˙ = − ∂
∂P
H(Z∗, H∗, P, µ, r) and µ(0) = 0 (4.6)
RA = [Y − trf − Z(rf )− bµ(rf )] /H(rf ) (4.7)
(e.g. Seiderstad and Sydsaeter (1987), p.276). Condition (4.6) expresses the
optimal spatial balance in traffic-induced pollution. Changes in pollution
level P (r) at location r should not raise utility and therefore land value at r
more than they diminish the social cost of the traffic-induced pollution they
generate on the other residents. Under Condition (4.7) the rent is equal to
the opportunity cost of land at the fringe. Although the above objective
function is not concave, we show in Appendix B that it accepts a unique
maximizer as the interior solution that we discuss below.
Consumption. The optimal allocation of housing H and composite
good Z follows from the same argument as for the equilibrium, except for
the presence of the shadow cost µ:
H = αu1/α P β/α(Y − tr − bµ)−(1−α)/α (4.8)
Z = (1− α) (Y − tr − bµ) (4.9)
In the absence of traffic-induced pollution (b = 0), those expressions match
the equilibrium conditions so that the equilibrium is efficient, which is rem-
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iniscent of the traditional theory of land markets (e.g. Fujita, 1989; Fujita
and Thisse, 2002).
The traffic-induced exposure shadow cost µ solves condition (4.6). Us-
ing the last expressions, condition (4.6) writes as µ˙ = βα
α
1−αu
1
1−α n1/(1−α)
P (α+β−1)/(1−α) (see also Appendix B). Since n and P are positive functions,
we have µ˙ > 0 and
µ(r) = βα
α
1−αu
1
1−α
∫ r
0
(H(s))−1/(1−α) (P (s))(α+β−1)/(1−α) ds (4.10)
which is nil at the city center and positive at all other locations. The traffic-
induced exposure shadow cost µ increases as r rises to rf . Households living
further away from the CBD have a longer commute and generate more ex-
posure to pollution for households located on their route to work. Thus, the
allocation of households in suburban locations is more costly to society than
an allocation in central areas.
Land value and fringe. In the first-best, the planner increases the
city extent as long as the value of land in the city lies above its opportunity
cost RA. That is, not only must condition (4.7) hold at r = rf but also its
right-hand side must fall with r in this neighborhood to have a maximum
aggregate land rent. Hence, on the one hand, using (4.7) and the above
values for H and Z, the first-best fringe distance can be computed as
rf = t
−1
[
Y − (1 + a)β u¯ RαA − b µ (rf )
]
Since µ ≥ 0, the fringe distance is smaller in the first-best allocation than
in the equilibrium. The planner reduces the endogenous traffic pollution
exposure by reducing city size. The traffic-induced exposure shadow cost at
the fringe depends on pollution levels and population density distribution
within the city. The higher the pollution (thus, population exposure) within
the city, the smaller the spatial extent of the first-best. Note that the city
shall not be empty if rf > 0; i.e. RA < R
o
A where R
o
A is the land opportunity
cost that solves the above equation for rf = 0 and µ(rf ) = µ(0) = 0. One
computes
RoA ≡
(
Y
(1 + a)βu
)1/α
(4.11)
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If RA ≥ RoA there is not enough surplus to develop a city. One can see that
RoA = R
∗
A so that the condition for a non-empty city is the same for the
first-best and the equilibrium. This is simply because when the city begins
to develop from a zero size, it incurs no traffic-induced pollution.
On the other hand, the land value should fall with r at r = rf . For
consistency we denote the first-best land value as R, as defined in (2.9). The
latter falls with r if and only if
·
R
R
= − 1
α
t+ b
·
µ
Y − tr − bµ −
β
α
·
P
P
< 0 (4.12)
which parallels the condition for convex land rents in the equilibrium. It
is shown in Appendix B that this condition is verified at r = rf for any
RA < R
oo
A such that
RooA ≡
α
β
1 + a
b
(
t+ b
·
µ(rf )
)
(4.13)
because
·
µ(rf ) is strictly positive. The planner may decide not to develop a
city if the opportunity costs of land are too high (RA > R
oo
A ).
Proposition 5. The planner develops a city if and only if RA < min{RoA, RooA }.
Under this condition, it sets a city with a smaller fringe distance than in the
equilibrium.
Since RoA = R
∗
A and R
oo
A > R
∗∗
A , the planner develops a city for oppor-
tunity costs of land that are higher than those for which a city emerges
in equilibrium. This is because the planner corrects for the traffic-induced
pollution externality and raises the net surplus and aggregate land value.
The left hand panel of Figure 4 displays first-best land values for the same
parameters as in Figure 2. In this figure the land value falls with distance
from the center. While the aggregate land value (ALR) of the first-best is
larger by definition, it cannot be theoretically said whether first-best land
values are higher or lower at every location than the equilibrium ones.
Spatial distribution of pollution exposure. The spatial distribu-
tion of pollution exposure is obtained by solving the differential equation
P˙ = −b/H with the initial conditions P (rf ) = 1 + a. Plugging in the above
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Figure 2: First-best land value and population density.
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Note: The left hand panel displays first-best land rent values and the right hand panel
shows the first-best population density distributions with traffic-induced pollution (b > 0).
values of H and reshuﬄing allows us to integrate the differential equation as
for (2.7) to get
P (r) = P0
[
a0 +
t
α
∫ rf
r
(Y − ts− bµ)(1−α)/(α)ds
]α/(α+β)
(4.14)
with P0 and a0 defined as in the previous section. The integral is smaller in
the first-best than in the equilibrium because the fringe distance is smaller
and the term bµ reduces the value of the integrand. Thus, exposure is lower
at each location in the first-best than in the equilibrium city.
Proposition 6. The first-best allocation has lower pollution exposure levels
at all locations.
Population density. The density is actually computed as
n(r) = α−1u−1/αP−β/α(Y − tr − bµ)(1−α)/α (4.15)
which is analogous to the equilibrium expression except for the presence of
the term bµ. We readily see that the presence of bµ > 0 in (4.15) decreases
densities while lower pollution increases them. Since lower densities decrease
pollution exposure, it is not a priori clear whether densities are larger or lower
in the first-best. Yet, at the city center r = 0, the density n(0) is higher in
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the first-best because P (0) is lower in the first-best, while µ(0) = 0. The
residents at the center do not need to be allocated as many land plots as in
the equilibrium to compensate for the negative externality of traffic-induced
air pollution. Similarly, at the city fringe r = rf , the density n(rf ) is lower
in the first-best as P (rf ) = 1 + a and µ(rf ) > 0. There, pollution exposure
is the same as in the equilibrium, while the planner reduces the number of
residents to reduce city traffic.
Proposition 7. Population density is higher at the city center but lower at
the city fringe in the first-best.
The right hand panel of Figure 4 presents the first-best density profile
(blue solid curve). It is a decreasing function of the distance from the city
center. One can observe that the density levels and gradients are markedly
lower in the presence of traffic-induced pollution. Figure 4 further compares
the first-best density profiles (blue solid curves) with the equilibrium density
(solid black curves). Again dotted curves present the solutions for RA > R
∗∗
A
and the black dashed curve the density profiles in the absence of traffic-
induced pollution (b = 0). The first-best allocation leads to a higher density
at the center and a lower density at the fringe. This suggests a pollution
shift from the suburb to the center.
Decentralized policy. In the above, the planner sets the allocation of
households’ consumptions and their locations. The planner can nevertheless
decentralize its plan by imposing a localized lump-sum tax from households
that is equal to bµ(r) (see Appendix B). The tax reduces the income such that
not only the demand for the consumption good matches the lower optimal
consumption, but also such that the demand for land use and the pollution
exposure level correspond to optimal levels. The tax is not budget balanced
since it is positive at all locations.
Proposition 8. The planner can decentralize the first-best allocation through
a localized lump-sum tax that increases with distance.
The pollution exposure externality takes place on commuting routes be-
tween each commuter and the many residents on the route. Since pollution
is a local public bad, one expects the planner to tax the commuters at each
place of pollution and according to the number of exposed households, which
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Figure 3: Equilibrium and first-best population density distributions
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Note: The figure compares the equilibrium (black) and first-best (blue) population density
distributions with traffic-induced pollution (solid lines). The dashed black line shows the
equilibrium density distribution without traffic-induced pollution (b = 0). Dotted lines
show the solutions for the land rent and density when RA is larger than min{R∗A, R∗∗A }
and min{RoA, RooA }.
seems to be a difficult task. Nevertheless, the planner has the simpler solution
of intervention at the residence place of emitters. This is because the spatial
distribution of the population fully determines both the spatial distributions
of pollution emission and exposure. The lump-sum tax at the residence place
is then a sufficient instrument to implement the optimal policy.
Figure 4 shows the value of the optimal localized lump-sum tax. The
value rises nearly linearly with commuting distance in locations that are not
too far from the center. It however reaches a ceiling in locations that are
very distant from the center. Practically, this suggests the application of a
tax per traveled kilometre in central locations and in small cities and a tax
per residence in the outer locations of large cities.
5. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have discussed the properties of the urban equilibrium
and first-best optimum when traffic-induced air pollution is endogenous. We
show that the aversion to pollution exposure reduces the urban population
size and results in flatter or non-monotonic population density distributions:
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Figure 4: Localized lump-sum tax.
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Note: bµ(r) is in monetary terms and represents the same parameters as in Figure 2.
the population density in locations near the center is reduced while locations
farther away from the center retain high population densities since households
prefer to move outward to escape air pollution exposure. Our equilibrium
analysis shows that dispersion from central areas is desired by households
in the case of local traffic-induced air pollution. By contrast, regional air
pollution has no such effect. In this respect, our analysis emphasizes that
the spatial extent at which residents consider air pollution does matter in
the determination of the city population size and density distribution.
The first-best policy consists of a localized lump-sum tax that increases
with distance from the centre. It leads to a smaller pollution exposure
throughout the city and a smaller city extent compared to the equilibrium.
Densities at the center are higher and densities at the fringe lower. It also
permits the development of cities for larger set of parameters (e.g. larger
opportunity cost of land). Nonetheless, the first-best tax yields a surplus to
the planner. The study of a second-best optimum where the planner has a
balanced budget would be of interest for future research.
Our results suggest that localized policies are essential in managing traffic-
induced pollution. Indeed, aggregate constraints on population size and ur-
ban extent are unlikely to induce the changes in urban land rents and pop-
ulation densities that make the equilibrium closer to the first-best. Rather,
we show that a localized lump-sum tax can be an appropriate instrument.
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Further, we have discussed the effects of cleaner vehicle technologies and
more fuel efficient fuel consumption on urban structures. Future research
should address the question of the interaction between households’ incomes
and those effects. While this paper focuses on the impact of localized and
aggregate pollutants, it would also be interesting to consider the interaction
of pollutants with larger and smaller diffusion distances.
Furthermore, we can consider the lack of information on the health danger
of traffic-induced pollution. If people are ignorant of health impacts due to
traffic-induced air pollution, our results show that cities are too dense and too
populated. It is important to bear this in mind when applying other urban
policies like anti-sprawl policies that actually further densify city centers.
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Appendix A: Equilibrium
Land rent and equilibrium uniqueness
Let us define the land rent as R(r, rf ). We can simplify (2.12) as
·
R
R
= − 1
α
t
Y − tr
[
1 +
−β
α + β
(Y − tr) 1α
(Y − tr) 1α − (Y − trf ) 1α + a0
]
It is negative for r ∈ [0, rf ] if and only if
(Y − tr) 1α ≥ α + β
α
[
(Y − trf ) 1α − a0
]
Since the LHS is a decreasing function of r, the land rent is a convex function
of r ∈ [0, rf ]. There are at most two roots for the equation R(r, rf ) = RA.
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Only the first root is compatible with the equilibrium condition R(rf , rf ) =
RA and R(r, rf ) ≥ RA for all r < rf . Hence, when it exists, the equilibrium
is unique. Evaluating the above condition at r = rf yields
a0 ≥ β
α + β
(Y − trf ) 1α
Using the expression of rf and replacing a0 and P0 by their values gives
RA ≤ R∗∗A where R∗∗A = αβ (1+a)b t.
Convexity of P (r)
Differentiating (2.7) and reshuﬄing yields
P
β
α
··
P = b (1− α) 1−αα +1 t (Y − r t) 1−αα −1α−1 u− 1α − β P βα−1 P˙ 2α−1
with P˙ = −b n. Replacing n(r), P0 and c0 and rf with their values, we find
that
··
P is positive at the fringe if and only if
RA ≤ R∗A = (1− α)
α
β
(a+ 1)
b
t
Comparative statics
Land rent gradients
We prove the effect of a and b on land rent gradients. Differentiating (2.8)
we get
·
P
P
=
α
α + β
d
dr
ln
[
(Y − tr)1/α − (Y − trf )1/α + a0
]
= − t
α + β
(Y − tr)1/α−1
(Y − tr)1/α − (Y − trf )1/α + a0
Note that a0 is an increasing function of a and a decreasing function of P0
while P0 is an increasing function of b. Therefore,
·
P/P falls for higher a and
lower b. The (negative) land rent gradient
·
R/R therefore becomes steeper
for higher a and lower b.
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Aversion to pollution exposure β
We show that P β/α rises with higher β. If a > b = 0, we have P β/α =
(1 + a)β/α, which rises with β.If a = 0 < b, we have
P
β
α =
[
1 + b
α + β
α2
u−1/α
∫ rf
r
(Y − ts)(1−α)/α ds
] β
α+β
where rf = t
−1 (Y − u¯ RαA) is independent of β. It can be checked that the
latter expression also increases with higher β.
Regional pollution a
We show that a lower global emission factor a causes lower equilibrium
pollution exposure P (r) everywhere in the city: (d/da) lnP (r) > 0. In-
deed, substituting tr by z, we get P (r) = P0 [a0 +B(tr)]
α/(α+β) where P0,
B(z, zf ) =
1
α
∫ zf
z
(Y − x)(1−α)/αdx and where zf ≡ trf falls with a by (2.10).
Noting that dP0/da = 0, we compute
d
da
lnP (r) =
α
α + β
d
da
ln [a0 +B(r, zf )]
=
α
α + β
1
a0 +B(r, zf )
(
da0
da
+
dzf
da
∂
∂zf
B(r, zf )
)
Plugging the equilibrium values of zf = trf and P0 we get
d
da
lnP (r) > 0 if
and only if RA < t (1 + a)α/(βb), which is true at the equilibrium where
RA < R
∗∗
A .
Appendix B: First-best
In this Appendix, we first prove the existence of a global maximum for the
planner’s program. We then check the properties of this maximum. We
finally derive the decentralized optimal policy.
Global maximum
In this section we prove that the first-best allocation is the unique solution
of the interior solution of the first order condition of the planner’s problem.
The Cobb-Douglas utility function is given by U (Z, H, P ) = κZ1−αHαP−β,
where 1 > α, β > 0, and where P (r) = 1 + a + b
∫ rf
r
n(s)ds. Then, using
n = 1/H and U = u, we have Z = v n
α
1−αP
β
1−α , where v ≡ (u/κ) 11−α . Using
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this we need to find the non-negative continuous function n∈ C([0, rf ]) that
maximizes W (n) ≡ ∫ rf
0
[Y − tr − Z(r)−RAH(r)] /H(r)dr or equivalently
W (n) =
∫ rf
0
[
(Y − tr)n(r)− v (n(r)) 11−α
(
1 + a+ b
∫ rf
r
n(s)ds
) β
1−α
−RA
]
dr
We prove that this function accepts a global maximum in four steps.
Step 1. Observe that W (n) is a weakly sequentially continuous functional
over the positive cone of C([0, rf ]). Weak sequential continuity means that,
for any weakly converging sequence {nk} from C([0, rf ]) we have W (nk) →
W (n0), where n0 is the weak limit of {nk}. Weak convergence of {nk} to n0
in C([0, rf ]) means that, for any Borel measure µ over [0, rf ], we have∫ rf
0
nk(r)dµ(r)→
∫ rf
0
n0(r)dµ(r)
Because W (n) is a composition of integrals and continuous functions, it is
clearly weakly continuous.
Step 2. Let us investigate the interior values for the first order condition.
Maximizing pointwise W (n) w.r.t n(s) we get∫ rf
0
[
(Y − tr)n(r)− v (n(r)) 11−α (1 + a+ b ∫ rf
r
n(s)ds
) β
1−α −RA
]
dr
(Y − ts) + v
1− α (n(s))
α
1−α
(
1 + a+ b
∫ rf
s
n(z)dz
) β
1−α
− vbβ
1− α
∫ rf
0
(n(r))
1
1−α I(s, r)
(
1 + a+ b
∫ rf
r
n(z)dz
)α+β−1
1−α
dr
= 0
where I(s, r) is an indicator function equal to (d/dn(s))
∫ rf
r
n(z)dz, which
yields 1 if s ≥ r and 0 otherwise. Therefore, after simplifying, using the
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definition of P and swapping r by s for readability, we get
(n(r))
α
1−α (P (r))
β
1−α + bβ
∫ r
0
(n(s))
1
1−α (P (s))
α+β−1
1−α ds =
1
v
(1− α) (Y − tr)
(5.1)
When r = 0, (5.1) boils down to the initial condition:
(n(0))
α
1−α (P (0))
β
1−α =
1
v
(1− α) (5.2)
Differentiating again w.r.t. r and suppressing the argument r yields α
1− α
·
n
n
+
β
1− α
·
P
P
n α1−αP β1−α + bβn 11−αP α+β−11−α = −t1
v
(1− α)
Using
·
P = −bn, this simplifies to the system of two differential non-linear
equations:
·
n = bβn2P−1 − t
αv
(1− α)2 n 1−2α1−α P− β1−α (5.3)
·
P = −bn (5.4)
The solution is uniquely pinned down by the following two conditions:
P (rf ) = 1 + a, and (n(0))
α
1−α (P (0))
β
1−α =
1
v
(1− α)Y (5.5)
Lemma 1. Conditions (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5) accept a unique solution n ∈
C([0, rf ]) such that κ0 < n(r) with κ0 > 0 close to zero.
Proof . The Picard–Lindelf theorem states the existence and uniqueness of
first order differential equation with well-defined initial condition and uni-
formly Lipschitz continuous function. The RHS of (5.3) is uniform Lipschitz
continuous in n ∈C([0, rf ]) and κ0 < n. Suppose also that P is continuous
and not equal to zero in the RHS of (5.3). Then, by the Picard–Lindelf
theorem, condition (5.3) accepts a unique solution n that is continuous. By
integrating (5.4) from rf where P (rf ) = 1 + a, we see that P is also con-
tinuous and strictly above zero. This confirms our supposition that P is
continuous and not equal to zero in the RHS of (5.3). Then, both (5.3) and
31
(5.4) accept a unique solution n ∈ C([0, rf ]) and P ∈ C([0, rf ]). QED
Step 3. Let us define the ball
B(κ0, κ1) ≡ {n ∈ C([0, rf ]) : κ0 ≤ n(r) ≤ κ1 ∀ r ∈ [0, rf ]}.
where κ1 is an additional scalar. We have the following result:
Lemma 3. If Y > trf , there exist (κ0, κ1) such that any non-negative global
maximizer n∗ ∈ C([0, rf ]) lies in the interior of B(κ0, κ1) (κ0 < n∗ < κ1) and
is the global maximizer on B(κ0, κ1). The functions n = κ1 and n = κ0 are
local minimizers on B(κ0, κ1).
Proof . Assume that, on the contrary, there is A ⊂ [0, rf ] of positive
Lebesgue measure, such that n∗(r) = κ0 for all r ∈ A. Choose a small
δ > 0 and B ⊂ A such that the Lebesgue measure B equals δ, and consider
nδ such that nδ(r) =κ0 for all r /∈ B and κ0 < nδ(r) < κ0 + δ for r ∈ B. By
choosing δ sufficiently small, we can make W (nδ) > W (κ0), which contra-
dicts n∗ being a maximizer. Indeed, let us write W (n) =
∫ rf
0
w(r, n, P (n))dr
with w(r, n, P ) = (Y − tr)n − vn 11−αP β1−α and P (n) = 1 + a + b ∫ rf
r
n(s)ds.
We have
w(r,nδ, P )− w(r, n∗, P ) = w′n(r, n∗, P ∗) (nδ − n∗)
+ w′P (r, n
∗, P ∗) (P (nδ)− P (n∗))
+O(δ2)
where
w′n(r, n, P ) = (Y − tr)−
v
1− αnP
β
1−α
w′P (r, n, P ) = −
βv
1− αn
1
1−αP
β
1−α−1
P (nδ)− P (n∗) ≤ bδmax
r∈B
[nδ(r)− n∗(r)] < bδ2
32
Then, we compute
w(nδ)− w(κ0)=
[
(Y − tr)− v
1− ακ0 (1 + a+ bκ0rf )
β
1−α
]
δ
− v β
1− α (κ0)
1
1−α (1 + a+ bκ0rf )
β
1−α−1 bδ2 +O(δ2)
where we used P (κ0) = 1 + a + bκ0rf . Again, W (nδ) > W (κ0) ⇐⇒∫ rf
0
nδ(r)dr ≥
∫ rf
0
κ0dr for any sufficiently small δ if
(Y − tr) > v
1− ακ0 (1 + a+ brfκ0)
β
1−α
We just have to take a small enough κ0 such that
Y − trf
v
(1− α) ≥ κ0 (1 + a+ bκ0rf )
β
1−α
and we get the result W (nδ) > W (κ0). Finally, by this argument, we can
state that n(r) = κ0 is a (local) minimizer.
Assume now that there is S ⊂ [0, rf ] of positive Lebesgue measure, such that
n∗(r) > κ1 for all r ∈ S, where
κ1 ≡ max
n≥0
[
Y n− v(1 + a)n 11−α
]
.
Then, consider n∗∗, defined as
n∗∗(r) ≡
{
κ1, r ∈ S,
n∗(r), r /∈ S.
Then W (n∗∗) > W (n∗), which is a contradiction. Hence, n∗(r) ≤ κ1 for all
r ∈ [0, rf ]. By the same argument, the solution n∗∗∗(r) ≡ κ1, r ∈ [0, rf ] is a
(local) minimizer on the set of functions such that 0 ≤ n(r) ≤ κ1. QED
Step 4. We finish the proof by the following: Because B is a weakly com-
pact subset of C([0, rf ]), while W (n) is weakly sequentially continuous, there
exists a global maximizer n ∗+ and global minimizer n
∗
− of W (n) over B (see,
e.g., Cea, “Optimization: Theory and Algorithms”, 1978, Ch. 2). Since
n(r) = κ0 and n(r) = κ1 define the border solutions on B(κ0, κ1), they are
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the only two border minimizers on B(κ0, κ1): there exist no other local or
global minimizers or maximizers on these borders. Hence, any maximizer is
necessarily a solution in the interior of B(κ0, κ1). By Lemma 2, (5.3), (5.4)
and (5.5) accept a unique solution with B(κ0, κ1), then this solution is the
global maximizer.
Second order differential equations For b 6= 0, conditions (5.3) and
(5.4) yield the following second-order non-linear differential equation in P :
··
P = −β
( ·
P
)2
P
+
bt (1− α)2
vα
(
−
·
P
b
) 1−2α
1−α
P
β
1−α
(5.6)
Using the solution of P , we can infer n using n = −
·
P/b. Using v = (u/κ)
1
1−α ,
the constant in the second term can be computed as bt (1− α) (αu) −11−α .
Shadow costs The first-best solutions with the shadow cost µ have been
derived in the text. For consistency we recover µ from the above analysis.
From (5.1), we can write
(n(r))
α
1−α =
1
v
(1− α) (P (r)) −β1−α [Y − tr − bµ(r)]
where
µ(r) ≡ βv
(1− α)
∫ r
0
(n(s))
1
1−α (P (s))
α+β−1
1−α ds = βu
1
1−αα
α
1−α
∫ r
0
(n(s))
1
1−α (P (s))
α+β−1
1−α ds
is the co-state variable of the Hamiltonian. Simplifying, we get the density,
land use and composite good consumptions
n(r) = α−1u−
1
αP (r)−
β
α [Y − tr − bµ(r)] 1−αα
H(r) = αu
1
αP (r)
β
α [Y − tr − bµ(r)]− 1−αα
Z(r) = vn
α
1−αP
β
1−α = (1− α) [Y − tr − bµ(r)]
that are presented in the paper.
The system can then be represented by the tupple of functionals (µ, n, P )
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such that
·
P = −bn
·
µ =
βv
(1− α)n
1
1−αP
α+β−1
1−α
n = α−1u−
1
αP−
β
α [Y − tr − bµ] 1−αα
Substituting for the value of n, we can reduce this system to the system with
the pair of functionals (µ, P )
·
P = − b
α
u−
1
αP−
β
α [Y − tr − bµ] 1−αα
·
µ =
β
α
u−
1
αP−
α+β
α [Y − tr − bµ] 1α
The initial conditions are µ(0) = 0 and P (rf ) = 1+a. These initial conditions
are easier to apply in numerical simulations.
Negative land rent gradient
Here, we express the second order condition at the fringe distance rf . That
is, dlnR/dr < 0 at r = rf .
The land value described by the RHS of (4.7), say R, falls with r if and only
if
d lnR
dr
= − 1
α
t+ b
·
µ
Y − tr − bµ −
β
α
·
P
P
< 0
at r = rf . This is true if and only if(
t+ b
·
µ
)
P > −β
·
P (Y − tr − bµ)
at r = rf . We have P (rf ) = (1 + a),
·
P (rf ) = −bn(rf ) = −bα−1u− 1α (1 + a)−
β
α
[Y − trf − bµ(rf )]
1−α
α ,
·
µ(rf ) =
β
α
u−
1
α (1 + a)−
α+β
α [Y − trf − bµ(rf )]
1
α . Re-
placing in the last expression, one can show that the inequality holds if
RA <
α
β
1+a
b
(
t+ b
·
µ(rf )
)
.
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Decentralized optimal policy
In the following, we discuss the decentralization of the first-best policy by
a set of subsidies. First-best variables are denoted with the superscript o
as in the text while equilibrium variables carry no superscripts. Let the
set of subsidies (sY , st, sZ , sH) be such that the household’s budget becomes
Y + sY = sZZ + sttr + sHHR. We get the following equilibrium variables:
H =
Y − sY − rtst
uλsH
Z = (1− α)Y − sY − rtst
sZ
λ = (Y − sY − rtst)
1
α
(
(1− α)
sZ
) (1−α)
α 1
sH
(P )
−β
α u−1−
1
α
For decentralization, we impose that equilibrium consumptions are equal to
those in the first-best: H = Ho and Z = Zo. So, we get the following
identities:
Y − sY − rtst
uλsH
=
1
λou
(Y − tr + µo(r))
(1− α)Y − sY − rtst
sZ
= (1− α) (Y − tr + µo(r))
where
λo = (1− α) (1−α)α (Y − tr + µo(r)) 1α P o−βα u−(α+1α )
With equal consumptions of land we also have equal pollution: P = P o. We
can simplify the two above identities as
Y − sY − rtst
Y − tr + µo(r) = s
α
Hs
(1−α)
Z = sZ
This last expression gives four instruments (sY , st, sZ , sH) and two equalities.
We focus on a policy system that is independent of the parameter α. This
implies sH = sZ = 1. So, the planner needs to verify the identity sY +
rt (1− st) = µo(r). The planner can set either a lump sum taxation such
that st = 1 and sY = µ
o(r), or a tax on travel such that sY = 0 and
st = 1− µo(r)/(t r). The former tax is more attractive since it requires only
proof of residence. The latter requires an additional (truthful) report of the
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traveled distances; also, it cannot be implemented by a fuel tax since st is
location dependent.
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